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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the current problems facing military housing, mainly 
inadequate quantity and quality to meet current demand. The Secretary of Defense 
testified before Congress that meeting today’s military housing requirements would 
necessitate 30-40 years of effort at a cost of approximately $20B, if funded under the 
traditional Military Construction (MILCON) appropriation. This study considers the 
following alternatives for solving the housing problem: the current approach of 
MILCON; Public Private Venture (PPV); and complete privatization. Results indicate 
that MILCON is slow and underfunded and will not efficiently solve the housing 
problem. Public Private Venture may be a more efficient alternative but is also slow 
based primarily on legal difficulties. Complete privatization is clearly the best 
alternative, but this option must also overcome primarily political resistance to the 
traditional MILCON process. Complete privatization appears to. be cheaper, more 
aligned with the private sector housing market, and would probably increase the Quality 
of Life (QoL) of all service members. 
. 
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Congressional testimony by the Secretary of Defense indicates that 200,000 
military family housing units are old and poorly maintained, and need to be renovated or 
replaced. Using traditional Military Construction (MILCON) funding, the Department of 
Defense (DoD) estimates that it will cost $20 billion to repair or replace current military 
housing. Furthermore, it is estimated that it will take 30-40 years to complete the task 
(GAO, NSIAD-98-178,1998). 
This thesis examines the military housing problem, particularly that of the US. 
Navy, and analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of various alternatives to minimize 
or solve the problem. MILCON, the Public Private Venture (PPV) and complete priva- 
tization of military housing are considered as alternatives. Conclusions are drawn as to 
the best alternative for solving the quantity, quality and Quality of Life (QoL) aspects of 
this important long-term issue. 
The Navy maintains ownership of approximately 60,000 of DoD's housing units. 
Approximately 75 percent of military members live in non-government owned housing, 
yet fleet concentration areas typically have long waiting lists for sailors wishing to 
occupy government quarters. The current waiting list for San Diego, for example, is 18 
months for some of the more desirable area housing units (Commander, Navy Region 
Southwest, 1999). 
Congress is seeking alternatives to the traditional processes of construction and 
modernization through MILCON. In 1996, Congress authorized a series of five-year, test 
pilot initiatives including: providing direct bans and loan guarantees, the leasing of 
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housing units, Differential Lease Payments (DLP), and the conveyance or leasing of 
existing property and facilities. These nontraditional alternatives are relying on the 
efficiencies inherent in the private sector housing market to help solve the housing 
problem in 10 years vice the projected 30-40 year timeframe using traditional MILCON 
procedures. 
Two prominent alternatives have also emerged as the most viable methods for 
solving the housing problem in a more timely manner: the Public Private Ventwe (PPV), 
and the complete privatization of all military housing (CNA, CRM 97-25, April 1997). 
This study examines the advantages and disadvantages of both of the major alternatives. 
B. THE PUBLIC PRIVATE VENTURE (PPV) 
The PPV is essentially a partnership with private sector contractors. Through 
complete private sector financing (the most ideal scenario) or govanment loan 
guarantees, contractors are encouraged to construct, renovate and maintain military 
housing stocks. This either takes place on privately obtained and held real estate or 
government leased, existing housing land. The government usually incorporates "right of 
fitst refusal" to military members in PPV communities. This preserves its ability to fill 
occupancies with military members vice private sector occupants but involves occupancy 
guarantee rates. Also incorporated are rental rate guarantees, which place rent ceilings on 
the units. These guarantees, incorporated into the construction contracts, ensure that 
military members (who pay the rent themselves out of housing allowances) are not 
subjected to sky-rocketing rental rates. 
There are several advantages to the PPV. First, by capturing the efficiencies and 
economies of scale realized by the private sector, units can be constructed and renovated 
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more quickly than the traditional, legislatively laden MILCON process. Second, unit 
designs are modeled after the prevailing styles of the surrounding area, often providing 
more personally desirable housing. Third, by constructing housing communities, the 
Navy maintains the ability to offer military community integrity to its sailors. This is 
often desirable f?om a security standpoint, both in terms of physical security and 
emotional security for deploying sailors that leave their families behind. Lastly, the 
government is able to maintain some control in PPVs. These are generally in the form of 
pre-determined rental control rates and government occupancy clauses (CNA, CRM 97- 
27, April 1997). 
The PPV is not without disadvantages, however. Loan guarantees are expensive. 
They must be backed by DoD dollars, thereby reducing available funds for Fleet 
modernization and other military requirements. Additionally, the government normally 
provides contractual guarantees of occupancy rates which are ultimately paid using 
housing allowance dollars. “Guaranteed” occupancy rates of 75 percent or greater are 
common. If the Navy can not produce occupants within a specified timeframe (usually 
30 days), then contractors are afforded the opportunity of renting the units to private 
sector individuals. To the extent that housing areas contain sizeable portions of private 
sector occupants, the notion of a military community is diminished 
Guaranteed occupancy rates often extend over decades, making the construction 
projects fdly amortizable, a necessary precursor to project profitability for private sector 
investors. This factor limits the government’s flexibility and control in changing 
busing strategy. 
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To ensure rental rate ceilings, the government must often provide subsidies to 
contractors or military members. These come in the form of direct payments to 
contractors to fill the delta between fixed rental rates and the prevailing market rate, or 
additional allowances to military families occupying PPV units (i.e., the Differential 
Lease Payment Program). If market rates steadily increase in certain areas, the govern- 
ment can potentially find itself having to pay more than anticipated for military housing 
(CNA, CRM 97-25, April 1997). 
The PPV also faces considerable legal and political hurdles. While not as 
encumbered as the traditional MILCON process, local politicians and fkderal acquisition 
regulations Iimit flexibility and responsiveness to requests for PPV implementation 
Furthermore, Congress, despite approving and encouraging the use of PPVs has recently 
instructed DoD to slow down its implementation of PPVs. Congress may perceive 
widespread implementation of PPVs as threatening to its constituents’ “bread and butter” 
MILCON projects. 
The Navy has implemented three PPV test programs located in Everett, WA, 
Corpus Christi, TX, and San Diego, CA. The San Diego project, for example, is begin- 
ning to solicit proposals fiom private contractors, thee and a half years after decision 
approval to study and (possibly) implement a PPV in that area (Naval Facilities 
Engineering Command Director, 1999). These types of delays appear routine and 
exemplify how the housing problem worsens over time. 
Another disadvantage to PPVs is the likelihood of unit quality deterioration over 
time. When private owners of PPV units are faced with rental rate and occupancy 
guarantees, they have little incentive to adequately maintain and modernize their housing 
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units. In completely private housing communities, for example, contractors that fail to 
adequately maintain and modernize their properties find themselves subject to market 
forces, i.e., potential occupants vote with their feet. 
C. COMPLETE PRIVATIZATION OF HOUSING 
An alternative to the PPV is the complete privatization of all military housing. 
DoD would remove itself from the housing business altogether allowing the private 
sector to respond to the demand. The apparent advantages appear compelling, yet there 
are also substantial disadvantages 
Complete privatization would remove current MILCON financial obligations 
producing an estimated $300 million per year in savings (CNA, CRM 97-25, April 1997). 
According to CNA, The Navy currently spends (in terms of MILCON and opportunity 
costs foregone) approximately $15,100 per year to house the average military family in 
government owned and maintained units; $13,100 of that comes from the Navy’s budget. 
The other $2,000 comes from the Department of Education’s School Impact Aid fund. 
To house sailors off base, the Navy spends an average of $8,100 per year per family 
through Basic Allowances for Housing (BAH); $7,900 of that comes from the Navy 
budget, and the remaining $200 comes from the School Impact Aid fund (CNA, CRM 
97-25, April 1997). In summary, it cost the Navy more to house members on, rather than 
off-base. 
An additional advantage of complete privatization is that the government would 
remove itself from competition with the private sector housing market, which is also a 
key goal of the Office of Management and Budget (Om) A-76 Circular, e.g., outsource 
all non-governmental functions. Additionally, privatization would allow sailors to 
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choose the quality and location of their living quarters commensurate with other U.S. 
citizens working for the federal government or private firms. This option is not available 
under the current system of government assigned housing. 
A disadvantage to complete privatization is that the military would lose control of 
housing. Installation commanders could no longer control where military members live, 
creating potential proximity and community integrity issues. There is also the possibility 
of increased rental market rates. Basic Allowance for Housing @AH) levels that were 
once adequate m y  become insufficient for some military families, forcing them to 
relocate to substandard housing. There is also the additional financial burden of 
incidental expenses, such as utilities, that are currently provided fiee-of-charge to 
members occupying government housing. 
One disadvantage of privatization is the perception that it may violate a Quality of 
Life (QoL) contract between the military and service members. It is common knowledge 
that some sailors take comfort in not having to personally locate and obtain housing for 
their fhmilies. The government has always provided this service. The added time and 
financial burden of sailors having to manage their own housing arrangements could add 
to the erosion of the QoL and benefits package. Lastly, some military locations are so 
remote and economically undesirable that the private housing market will fail to provide 
housing, i.e., there are notable exceptions to the privatizing alternative. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The current system of MILCON provided housing is apparently unable to solve 
the considerable housing problem facing the U.S. military. Evidently, no one has the 
time (30-40 years) or the funding ($20B) to expeditiously solve the problem. There are 
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alternatives. The questions revolve around the merits and impediments of the various 
alternatives, including the political will to execute timely solutions. Loans and 
occupancy and rental rate contractual guarantees may be more costly than anticipated. 
From a completely economic standpoint, privatization of all military housing makes 
sense, but there are substantial barriers: political and legal; loss of control concerns; and 
erosion of benefds to name a few. 
This thesis examines each of these elements in fbrther detail, and draws a 
conclusion supporting privatization as the “best” alternative for solving the housing 
crisis. Chapter 11 provides a literary background to military housing and basic 
descriptions of the alternatives. Chapter 111 provides a more detailed description of the 
housing problem, and Chapters IV and V analyze the two main alternatives, Public 
Private Venture (PPV) and complete privatization, respectively. Chapter VI ends with 
conclusions and recommendations. 
7 
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11. BACKGROUND 
A. CURRENT MILITARY HOUSING PROBLEM 
The Navy’s current supply of military housing is inadequate, both in terms of 
quantity and quality. A Congressional testimony by the Secretary of Defense (1 998) 
indicates that 200,000 military family housing units are old, not adequately maintained 
and need to be renovated or replaced. 
Using traditional Military Construction (MILCON) funding, DoD estimates that it 
will cost $20 billion to repair or replace current military housing. Furthermore, it is 
estimated that it will take 30-40 years to complete the task (GAO, NSIAD-98-178, 
1998). 
The Navy maintains ownership of approximately 60,000 of DoD’s housing units. 
And while 75 percent of military members live in non-governmentally owned housing, 
many fleet concentration areas are experiencing long waiting lists for sailors wishing to 
occupy government quarters. The current waiting list for San Diego, for example, is 
comprised of 6600 (up from 5000 in 1997) fitmilies and an 18 month average wait time 
(Fuentes, 1999). 
Realizing the urgency of k i n g  this housing problem, as it directly impacts 
quality of life, Congress is seeking alternatives to the traditional processes of construction 
and modernization through MILCON and has authorized a series of five-year, test pilot 
initiatives (GAO, NSIAD-98-1 78,1998). Aimed at utilizing the efficiency of the private 
sector housing market, the DoD plan offers several non-traditional alternatives. They 
include the provision of direct loan guarantees to private contractors to construct or 
modernize housing, and the conveyance or leasing of existing DoD property and/or 
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facilities to the private sector. The goal of these initiatives is to remedy the current 
h o u s e  dilemma in ten years, vice the projected 30-40 year timefiame, given traditional 
MILCON procedures. 
B. MILITARY CONSTRUCTION (MILCON) 
Despite the DoD housing policy of the 1990~~  which recognizes the local 
community as the principal source of housing for military families (Desbrow, 1998), 
MILCON remains the primary means by which DoD builds military housing. 
Historically, the need for MILCON-provided housing is a result of the surrounding 
community’s inability to meet the military housing requirements for the area (Van Oss, 
1990). The market’s failure to adequately provide housing, in these cases, is generally 
attributed to the communities’ inability to meet DoD guidelines for price, size and 
location @esbrow, 1998). 
Once a determination has been made of inadequate private Sector provision of 
housing, a MILCON project request must be generated. In accordance with the Planning, 
Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS), such requests must be incorporated into the 
requesting service’s Program Objective Memorandum (POM). As any given POM 
incorporates the upcoming fiscal year, as well as the following six years, there exists 
inherent uncertainty as to the year of funding agproval and authorization, ifat all. A 
MILCON project, therefore, will generally not provide actual housing units, available for 
occupancy, for a period of four to ten years afker the date of initial POM submission (Van 
Oss, 1990). 
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C. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION ONE - PUBLIC PRIVATE VENTURE (PPV) 
Governmental and privately contracted analysis have revealed two prominent 
alternatives to mitigate the housing problem: Public Private Venture (PPV) and the 
complete privatization of all military housing. 
The PPV is essentially a partnership with private sector contractors. Though 
complete private sector financing (the most ideal scenario) or government loan 
guarantees, contractors are encouraged to construct, renovate and maintain military 
housing stocks. This either takes place on privately obtained and held real estate or 
governmentally leased, existing housing land. The government usually incorporates 
"right of first refusal" to military members in PPV communities, preserving its ability to 
fill occupancies with military members, vice private sector occupants, with occupancy 
guarantee rates. Also incorporated are rental rate guarantees, which place rent ceilings on 
the units. These guarantees, incorporated into the construction contracts, ensure that 
military members (who pay the rent themselves out of housing allowances), are not 
subjected to sky-rocketing rental rates. 
There are several advantages to the PPV. First, by capturing the efficiencies and 
economies of scale realized by the private sector, units can be constructed and renovated 
much more quickly than the traditional, legislatively laden MILCON process. Second, 
unit designs are modeled after the prevailing styles of the surrounding area, often 
providing more personally desirable housing. Third, by constructing housing commun- 
ities, the Navy maintains the ability to offer military community integrity to its sailors. 
This is often desirable fiom a security standpoint, both in terms of physical security and 
emotional security for deploying sailors that must leave their fiunilies behind. Lastly, the 
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government is able to maintain some control in PPVs. These are generally in the form of 
pre-determhed rental control rates and government occupancy clauses. 
The PPV is not without disadvantages, however. Loan guarantees cost a lot of 
money. They must be backed by DoD dollars and thereby preclude the spending of this 
money on other departmental objectives (i.e., fleet modernization). Additionally, the 
government must usually provide contractual guarantees of occupancy rates and, hence, 
housing allowance dollars. “Guaranteed” occupancy rates of 75 percent or greater are 
common (Commander, Navy Region Southwest, 1999). And, when the Navy cannot 
produce occupants within a specified tirnefiame (usually 30 days), contractors are 
afforded the opportunity of renting the units to private sector individuals. This, alone, 
has the potential to undermine the goal of preserving a military community integrity 
(CNA, CFW 97-27, April 1997). 
These guarantees often extend over decades, as this makes the construction 
projects hlly amortizable, a necessary precursor to project profitability for private sector 
investors. This factor also limits the government’s flexibility and control in changing 
housing strategy. 
To ensure rental rate ceilings, the government must often provide subsidies to 
contractors or military members. These come in the form of direct payments to 
contractors, to fill the delta between fixed rental rates and the prevailing market rate, or 
additional allowances to military families occupying PPV Units (i.e., the Differential 
Lease Payment Program (DLP)). If market rates steadily increase in certain areas, the 
government may potentially fmd itself having to pay more than anticipated for military 
housing (CNA, CRM 97-25, April 1997). 
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The PPV also fixes considerable legal and political hurdles. While not as 
encumbered its the traditional MILCON process, local politicians and federal acquisition 
regulations limit flexibility and responsiveness to requests for PPV implementation. 
Furthermore, Congress, despite approving and encouraging the use of PPVs, has recently 
instructed DoD to slow down its implementation of PPVs (Commander, Navy Region 
Southwest, 1999). The reasons for this decision are unclear, but speculation is that 
Congress perceives widespread implementation of PPVs as a threat to its constituents’ 
“bread and’butter,” MULCON projects. 
The Navy has implemented three PPV test programs located in Everett, WA, 
Corpus Christi, TX, and San Diego, CA. The San Diego project, for example, is just 
now beginning to solicit proposals from private contractors, three and one half years after 
decision approval to study and possibly implement a PPV in that area (Director, Naval 
Facilities Engineering Command, San Diego, 1999)! 
Another disadvantage to PPVs is the likelihood of unit quality deterioration over 
time. Private owners of PPV units, when faced with rental rate and occupancy 
guarantees, have little incentive to adequately maintain and modernize their housing 
units. In completely private housing comunities, for example, contractors that fail to 
adequately maintain and modernize their properties find themselves without occupants. 
People move to more desirable housing communities. 
D. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION TWO - COMPLETE PRIVATIZATION 
An alternative to the PPV is the complete privatization of all military housing. 
DoD would remove itself from the housing business altogether, allowing the private 
sector to fully meet demand. 
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The advantages to this program are several. First, it would remove current 
MILCON financial obligations, producing an estimated $300 milliodyea savings (CNA, 
CRM 97-25, April 1997). The Navy currently spends (in terms of MILCON and 
opportunity costs foregone) $15,1OO/year to house the average military family in 
government owned and maintained units. $1 3,100 of that spending comes directly fiom 
the Navy’s budget. The other $2,000 comes &om the Department of Education’s School 
Impact Aid fund. To house sailors off-base, the Navy spends an average of $8,1OO/year 
on the average family through Basic Allowances for Housing (BAH). $7,900 of that 
money comes directly &om the Navy budget, and the remaining $200 comes &om the 
School Impact Aid fund. 
An additional advantage of complete privatization is that the government would 
remove itself &om competition with the private sector housing market, a goal of the 
OMB A-76 Circulat. 
Lastly, sailors would be allowed to fieely choose the quality and location of their 
desired housing, an option not available under the current system of governmentally 
assigned housing. 
There are disadvantages to complete privatization, however. The military would 
lose control of housing, for example. Installation commanders could no longer control 
where military members live, creating potential proximity and community integrity 
issues. There is also the possibility of increased rental market rates. BAH levels that 
were once adequate may possibly become insufficient for some military families, forcing 
them to relocate to substandard housing. This does not take into account the additional 
financial burden of incidental expenses, such as utilities, that are currently provided fiee- 
14 
of-charge to members occupying government housing. There is also the perceived 
violation of the entire quality of life package. Many sailors take comfort in not having to 
personally locate and obtain housing for their W i e s .  The government has always 
DoNe it for them. The added time and financial burden of sailors having to do this on 
their own has the potential to fiuther erode the perceived benefits package. Lastly, some 
military locations are so remote and economically undesirable that the private housing 
market will fail to provide housing. What will military members do in these cases? 
The government, given the above economic considerations, would most likely 
have to increase housing allowances to its military members. The projected MILCON 
savings, given complete privatization, should be adequate to accomplish this event. 
15 
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111. DESCRIPTION OF THE HOUSING PROBLEM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the context of the housing problem (i.e., political, 
economic, societal, and historical factors). It also discusses mandates, mission and 
current strategies for dealing with quantitative and qualitative housing shortfalls. 
B. POLITICAL, SOCIETAL AND HISTORICAL FACTORS 
To better understand the housing problem, certain environmental or contextual 
factors are discussed. Although some of these factors are external to the housing 
problem, they are relevant for understanding how different political, economic and 
societal forces can influence the housing problem and solutions. 
1. Political 
The decisions determining the quantity and quaiity of military housing have 
political origins and ramifications. All housing development and construction projects, 
with the exception of minor renovations below $500,000, must be Congressionally 
approved and funded through the Military Construction (MILCON) appropriation. An 
annual appropriation, MILCON dictates approval of housing development, construction 
or renovation (in excess of $500,000) by granting budget authority. Desired projects are 
considered for approval by means of service Program Objective Memoranda (POM) 
requests submitted through the Secretary of Defense (OSD) as part of the PIanning, 
Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) (Schick, 1995). 
The MTLCON appropriation process often reflects Congressional self interest, 
which may override military concerns for efficiency, cost-effectiveness and quality of 
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life. The appropriation allows Congress to distribute housing construction projects based 
more on geographic and constituency concerns vice specific service needs. This attribute 
has historically fostered parochial interests vice the prioritized planning and development 
requests of the individual services (Wildavsky, 1997). 
There also exists the potential of political pressure fiom within the individual 
services. While Service Chiefs promulgate doctrine and policy on their services’ military 
housing goals and objectives, these m y  conflict with the goals of major claimants or 
regional commanders. Some geographic regions, for example, face greater housing 
challenges (ie., meeting demand and improving quality) than other areas. This is often 
true in high cost-of-living fleet concentration areas such as San Diego (Commander, 
Navy Region Southwest, 1999). These areas subsequently face the simultaneous 
challenges of greater housing needs, imposed fiscal constraints and high housing costs. 
Regional goals, therefore, have the potential of conflicting with service policy, doctrine 
and local conditions, thereby generating political friction. 
2. Economic 
Meeting the economic needs to repair (to a level of comparable contemporary 
standards) and replace existing housing to meet the quantity and quality demanded is 
costly. Additional units must be constructed to meet housing demands, and renovations 
performed to upgrade housing standards. For example, in 1996 RAND calculated the 
average age of the military housing stock at 33 years. The Department of Defense @OD) 
testified before Congress in March 1998 that replacing andor upgrading existing fknily 
housing, though traditional military construction financing (MIL,CON), would cost over 
$20 billion and could take 30-40 years (GAO, NSIAD-98-178,1998). 
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3. Social 
Societal factors, such as the expectations of military members to live in military 
housing, have a bearing on the housing problem. In other words, military families for 
generations have moved fiom base to base and have grown accustomed to the familiarity 
of moving into a military neighborhood. This custom is part of the “social” contract 
between the military and its members. 
Other societal expectations and benefits can influence the housing issue, such as: 
the acculturation of junior military personnel, h i l y  support when members deploy, 
military neighbors and fostering military values (RAND, MR-1020-OSD, 1999). As 
service members place high or low values on these societal benefits, demand for housing 
would rise or fall accordingly. Quality of Life (QoL) surveys reveal that approximately 
60 percent of families surveyed cite sound economic decision, given a minimum quality 
of housing, as their primary reason for electing military housing. Approximately 25 
percent of families additionally cite increased security, proximity to work and immediate 
availability as their reasons for electing military housing (RAND, MR-1020-OSD, 1999). 
Additionally, communities surrounding military housing areas generate their own 
societal input influencing housing decisions. Some areas welcome the addition of 
military housing communities and families, because they increase the area’s economic 
base (Commander, Navy Region Southwest, 1999). Some areas would not desire 
separate military housing, particularly if the units were in disrepair. The point is that 
certain societal influences, be they internal or external to the military, would need to be 
considered when crafting solutions to the housing problem. 
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4. Historical 
Prior to 1984, all construction and renovation of military housing was 
accomplished by means of k C O N  funding. In 1984, however, Congress passed the 
Military Construction Authorization Act, Section 801. This allowed the federal 
government to enter into Public Private Ventures (PPV) with private developers. Service 
secretaries, by terms of the authorization act, were authorized to enter into leasing 
projects for a period of up to 20 years. The leases were renewable only when the projects 
were undertaken on privately owned land parcels. Federally owned land was not subject 
to lease renewal. 
Developers, under Section 801 provision, are responsible for all clevelopment and 
construction costs. Housing rents would be directly paid by the government, who would 
not grant housing allowances to service members occupying the leased units. Service 
members would, therefore, live “rent fiee” in the units, similar to the existing structure 
under traditional MILCON-provided military housing units. 
C. MANDATES, MISSION AND CURRENT STRATEGY 
1. Mandates 
Through collaboration with Congress, as reflected in the legislative mandates 
discussed below, DoD was given legal authority to adopt housing policies intended to 
capture the economic efficiencies of the private sector. The premise behind the 
legislation is for the military to utilize the private sector’s extensive investment capital 
base as well as housing construction expertise and efficiency. Through the provision of 
the legislative incentives, such as loan guarantees or the use of federal land, the military 
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hopes to entice the private sector to build or renovate military or unaccompanied housing 
utilizing private investment funds. 
By utilizing private sector investment capital, DoD hopes to reduce near-term 
outlays for housing acquisition or construction by spreading costs over many years. This 
is as opposed to having to fully fund construction projects in the year of their approval, as 
is the case with traditional MILCON-funded housing projects under score keeping. 
In addition to Section 801, the ‘Build-to-Lease” Program of the 1984 Military 
Construction Authorization Act, the Act also contained several other provisions. These 
additional provisions provided fkther alternatives, marking system direction for the 
economically efficient and timely provision of military housing. 
a. 
Similar to Section 801, Section 802 increased flexibility within the 1984 
Military Construction Authorization Act. Section 802’s first additionaI provision is that 
it increased the maximum length for which lease programs could be enacted between the 
government and the private sector. Rather than the previous limit of 20 years for 
maximum lease length, under Section 801, Section 802 extended the lease length limit to 
25 years. Under a 25-year lease, however, the government is legally unable to renew the 
lease, unlike the 20-year lease programs, which were renewable when leases were entered 
on non federally-owned land parcels. Both Sections, 801 and 802, forbid the renewal of 
leases on federally owned land. 
Section 802 uRental Guarantee Program” 
Additionally, under Section 802, government lease agreements guaranteed 
an occupancy rate of no less than 97 percent for the life of the contract. Housing rents 
would be directly paid by service members to the private contractors and would be 
21 
predominately comprised of the service members’ BAH funding. Rental rates, in 
accordance with lease terms, would be set at the prevailing market rate and were, 
resultantly, subject to market fluctuations (Van Oss, 1990). 
Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 b. 
With the passage of the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990, federal 
agencies are required to “score” housing leasing agreements. Scoring mandates the full 
obligation of budget authority, equal to the full cost of projects, prior to the initial 
approval of contracts. Housing development and construction projects, therefore, must 
be fully funded (obligated) prior to breaking ground on any development or construction 
projects. So, rather than amortizing construction and development costs over the life of 
the actual construction project, program costs must be fully amortized in the year of 
implementation. Given the high dollar value of construction projects, this legislation 
made full costs immediately visible within any single budget year. When faced with such 
large costs, DoD must decide between military housing and development vice funding 
the development and acquisition of major weapon systems, also subject to scoring under 
the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990. As weapon systems, historically, have a 
tendency to be deemed core competencies, housing, in the face of scoring, is often 
relegated to lower priority status. Services, in essence, chose ‘hot to afford” the large up- 
front obligation of funds for construction projects but, rather, chose major weapon 
systems acquisitions and developments (Desbrow, 1998). 
c. Title 10, “2667 Lease” Program 
Title 10, U.S. Code Section 2667 contains significant differences from 
Sections 1 and 2. First, under Section 2667, construction is mandated by local building 
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codes, not DoD specifications. Local construction codes have a propensity to be less 
restrictive than DoD specifications. This has the potential to reduce the costs associated 
with developing and implementing construction projects. Additionally, under this 
provision, construction projects are not subjected to the Davis-Bacon Wage Act, which 
mandates federal wage standards set by the Department of Labor. Instead, contractors 
are fiee to pay the local prevailing wage rates for their labor. This, too, has the potential 
to reduce project construction costs (Van Oss, 1990). 
Another key provision within Section 2667 is the ability of the services to 
use non-excess federal land for housing construction sites. This affords greater flexibility 
in the choice of proposed construction project sites. 
Lastly, Section 2667 sets lease requirements to a minimum of five years. 
More importantly, however, it removes statutory limits on the maximum length of lease 
contracts. This affords more flexibility to military decision makers in evaluating the 
potential long term benefits of lease proposals. Moreover, it creates a security incentive 
for developers by guaranteeing longer lease terms, making projects more profitable in the 
long run (Bielek, 1999). 
Section 2667 has not been used extensively by DoD since its enactment 
into legislation. It has met with success, however, with the Sun Bay Apartment and 
Resort complex on the site of the former Fort Ord, CA (Van Oss, 1990). 
d 
Realizing some of the inability of Section 801,802 and 2667 to rectify the 
Title IO, US. Code Sections 2871-2885 
military housing situation, DoD petitioned Congress for additional legislation to afford 
more housing opportunities. As a result, Congress passed the Military Family Housing 
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Revitalization Act of 1996 as part of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1996. 
The provisions of this act became Title 10, U.S. Code Sections 2871-2885. The 
legislative authority provided within the act was limited to five years. During this "test 
period," DoD was required to monitor and analyze all new programs undertaken in 
accordance with the new act, in an effort to judge new programs' effectiveness in dealing 
with the miiitary family housing problem (GAO, NSIAD-98-178, 1998). 
The specific provisions of the relevant Title 10 sections are listed below: 
1 .  Direct Loans: The Department of Defense @OD) may make direct loans 
to persons in the private sector to provide funds for the acquisition or 
construction of housing units suitable for use as military family or 
unaccompanied housing (10 U.S.C. 2873(a), (1)). 
2. Loan Guarantees: DoD may guarantee a loan to any person in the private 
sector if the proceeds of the loan are used to acquire or construct housing 
units suitable for use as military family housing or unaccompanied 
housing (10 U.S.C. 2873(b)). 
3. Build or Lease: DoD may enter into contracts for the lease of military 
family or unaccompanied housing Units to be constructed under the 
initiative (10 U.S.C. 2874). 
4. Investments in nongovernmental entities: DoD may take investments in 
nongovernmental entities carrying out projects for the acquisition or 
construction of housing units suitable for use as military family or 
unaccompanied housing. An investment under this section may include a 
limited partnership interest, a purchase of bonds or other debt instruments, 
or any combination of such forms of investment (10 U.S.C. 2875(a), (b)). 
5. Rental guarantees: DoD may enter into agreement with private persons 
that acquire or construct military family or unaccompanied housing units 
under the initiative to guarantee specified occupancy levels or to guarantee 
specific rental income levels (10 U.S.C. 2876). 
6. Differential lease payments: Pursuant to an agreement to lease military 
family or unaccompanied housing to servicemembers, DoD may pay the 
lessor an amount in addition to the rental payments made by military 
occupants to encourage the lessor to make the housing affordable to 
military members (1 0 U.S.C. 2877). 
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7. Conveyance or lease of existing property and facilities: DoD may convey 
or lease property or facilities, including ancillary support facilities to 
private persons for the purposes of using the proceeds to cany out 
activities under the initiative (10. U.S.C. 2878). 
8. Interim leases: Pending completion of a project under the initiative, DoD 
may provide for the interim lease of completed units. The term of the 
lease may not extend beyond the project’s completion date (i 0 U.S.C. 
2879). 
9. Conformity with similar local housing units: DoD will ensure that the 
room patterns and floor areas of military family and unaccompanied 
housing units acquired or constructed under the initiative are generally 
comparable to the room patterns and floor areas of similar housing units in 
the locality concerned. Space limitations by paygrade on military family 
housing units provided in other legislation will not apply to housing 
acquired under the initiative (1 0 U.S.C. 2880(a), (b)). 
10. Ancillary supporting fhcilities: Any project for the acquisition or 
construction of military family or unaccompanied housing units under the 
initiative may include the acquisition or construction of ancillary 
supporting facilities for the housing (1 0 U.S.C. 288 1). 
1 1.  Assignment of members of the armed forces to housing units: DoD m y  
assign servicemembers to housing units acquired or constructed under the 
initiative (10 U.S.C. 2882). 
12. Lease payments through pay allotments: DoD may require 
servicemembers who lease housing acquired or constructed under the 
initiative to make lease payments by allotment fiom their pay (10 U.S.C. 
2882(~)). (GAO, NSIAD-98- 178, 1998) 
2. Mission 
Part of the mission of the restructuring of housing allowances fiom the Basic 
Allowance for Quarters (BAQ) and Variable Housing Allowance (VHA) to the Basic 
Allowance for Housing @AH) is to bring out-of-pocket expenses back down to the 15 
percent mandate. Through the utilization of the BAH fiamework and, more importantly, 
the aforementioned Iegislative reforms, DoD hopes to redistribute financial savings to 
25 
members receiving BAH, bringing out-of-pocket expenses down to 18.8 percent in 2000 
and 15.8 percent in 2003 (Garamone, 1999). 
Despite aggressive goals and DoD’s active pursuit of implementing the new 
initiatives, however, GAO has concluded that actual progress has been slow. DoD 
attributes the slow pace to the need to hdliarize itselfwith a new way of doing business. 
Specifically, DoD maintains that new legal, financial, management, contractual and 
budgetary scoring issues have to be addressed and resolved. DoD has revised its 
estimated timefitme to rectlfy the housing problem &om 10 to 14 years (GAO, NSIAD- 
98-178, 1998). 
GAO m h e r  asserts the DoD is lacking a “standardized methodology for 
comparing life-cycle costs of proposed privatization projects with military construction 
alternatives” (GAO, NSIAD-98-178, 1998). There appears to be no overall strategy to 
effectively employ the initiatives. 
3. strategy 
The current strategy for housing military families consists of two components 
(CNA, CRM 97-27, April 1997). The first component is the provision of military owned 
and operated housing. It is located on or near military installations and is provided free 
of charge to qualifying e l i e s .  This component is entirely funded through the use of 
MILCON funds. The second component consists entirely of monetary allowances 
provided to service members. Families use these allowances, which differ by military 
rank, dependent status and duty location, to rent or purchase civilian housing in commun- 
ities surrounding military installations. 
26 
Monetary allowances for housing, by law, are designated to provide only 85 
percent (as a minimum) of civilian housing costs, leaving the remaining 15 percent to be 
borne as out-of-pocket expenses by military families occupying civilian housing. 
Government owned and maintained housing, on the other hand, is fimded 100 percent, 
leaving no out-of-pocket expenses to be borne by service members and their families 
(RAND, MR-1020-OSD, 1999). 
Historical data indicate that the disparity in out-of-pocket expenses borne by the 
service members occupying civilian housing is even larger. Data indicate that service 
members bear, on average, 20 percent of housing costs out-of-pocket, rather than the 
stated policy of 15 percent (CNA, CRh4 97-25, April 1997). This is attributed to 
budgetary constraints, not expensive housing preferences on the parts of service members 
occupying civilian housing (RAND, MR- 1 020-OSDY 1999). 
According to CNA, any strategy for shifting military housing to private sector 
provision, in whole or part, must accomplish two things. First, it must raise housing 
allowances to a level adequate to compensate service members for the loss of “fiee” (zero 
out-of-pocket expenses) base housing. Second, it must shift resources (i.e., h d s  for 
operation and maintenance, MILCON, revitalization, and revenues h m  the sale or lease 
of current assets) fiom current family housing to hnd increased housing allowances 
(CNA, CRM-97-25, April 1997). 
DoD has stated its intended strategy as the integration, over time, of the 
privatization program with other elements of its current housing program. DoD stated, 
however, that it would not focus its full attention to the complete integration yntil it has 
demonstrated success with elements of the privatization initiative. DoD hopes to 
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demonstrate success through financial savings and quality of life improvements as a 
result of one of its fifteen test pilot privatization programs (GAQ, NSIAD-98-178, 1998). 
DoD’s goal is to have the private sector invest at least $3 in military housing 
construction for every dollar that it spends. By doing this, DoD officials have publicly 
stated that they anticipate rectlfjring the military housing dilemma within ten years, as 
opposed to the projected 30-40 year timefiame associated with traditional MILCON 
methods (GAO, NSIAD-98-178’1998). 
DoD believes that further efficiency can be obtained through the private sector’s 
use of commercial specifications and standards, as well as local building codes (GAO, 
NSIAD-98-178, 1998). This is as opposed to the use of DoD standards and guidelines, a 
requirement under traditional MILCON, which tend to more strict. Local contractors, 
accustomed to local codes and specifications, find themselves unequipped to be in 
compliance with the DoD standards and subsequently often fail to bid on government 
construction projects. By allowing contractors to comply with local standards, DoD 
hopes that more contractors will bid on projects, thereby reducing costs through 
competition (GAQ, NSIAD-98-178, 1998). 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter describes the housing problem in terms of political, economic and 
societal factors and how they influence the housing problem and solutions. It specifically 
addresses the environment and context in which military housing construction exists, and 
how this environment shapes direction. The legislative authority recently granted to 
DoD, as outlined in the chapter, provides numerous opportunities to serve as key success 
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factors. Overall system direction on how to strategically implement these factors 
(mandates) appears to be lacking, however, according to GAO. 
Chapters IV and V '&ill focus on the most widely-studied, forerunning alternatives 
to repairing and replacing military housing, the Public Private Venture (PPV) and 
complete privatization of military housing. 
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IV. THE PUBLIC PRIVATE VENTURE (PPV) 
This chapter analyzes the components, variations, advantages and disadvantages 
of the Public Private Venture (PPV). Generalized studies conducted by the Center for 
Naval Analyses (CNA), as well as proposal audits conducted by the General Accounting 
Office (GAO) will be evaluated. Lastly, a brief analysis of San Diego's current PPV 
project proposal will be evaluated. 
A. BACKGROUND 
Prior to the 1996 Defense Authorization Act DoD was confined to two basic ways 
of providing housing benefrts to military service members and their families. The first 
was the direct provision of military-owned housing, which was provided "rent free" and 
was usually on a military base. The second alternative was to provide housing 
allowances to service members. As of 1997, DoD owned and operated military housing 
for approximately one third of its service members (CNA, CRM 97-27, April 1997). 
This ratio is generally an overstatement in the aggregate, with major fleet concentration 
areas like San Diego, for example, providing owned and operated rdlitary housing for 
approximately one quarter of its service members (Commander, Navy Region Southwest, 
1999). 
Under the National Performance Review led by Vice President A1 Gore and the 
Office of Management and Budget (OM) Circular A-76, the poky  of saving money by 
privatizing and outsourcing was formally established. The savings are derived by 
eliminating some non-governmental functions and outsourcing some hnctions to a "more 
efficient" private sector. Another cost saving initiative is emerging: the enactment of 
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cooperative, cost-cutting, Public Private Ventures (PPVs). These PPVs, as they pertain to 
the housing of military service members and their families, are heralded as being capable 
of increasing or enhancing facilities while simultaneously decreasing costs (Desbrow, 
1998). 
Specifically, the powers afforded the military services through the use of PPVs 
involve the direct sale or lease of property andor facilities to the private sector. By 
capturing the efficiencies of the private sector housing market, the sale or leasing 
property and facilities, theoretically generate revenue, by means of cost savings. 
Private firms, which can supposedly develop and manage the services’ resources 
more efficiently, bid to purchase or lease the assets. When the bid price of these firms 
exceeds that of the current value of the assets to the military, the assets will be sold or 
leased. In theory, the most efficient private firm will bid the highest price for the assets, 
utiliziig its own efficiencies to ensure a profit, thereby developing the asset for its most 
productive use. In economic terms, this is the fundamental premise of flee market 
enterprise (CNA, CRM 97-27, April 1997). 
B. 1996 DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION LEGISLATION 
The 1996 Defense Authorization Act aligned with the National Performance 
Review and provided new legislative authority for DoD to enter into contractual agree- 
ments with the private sector to provide affordable housing to military members. The 
new authorities encompassed within the act are commonly referred to as joint Public 
Private Ventures. They generally involve the use of government assets (land and/or 
capital) coaligned with private sector firms, who are thereby motivated to construct and 
maintain affordable housing for military members. 
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The powers granted to DoD are intentionally broad. This is to encourage the 
development of creative solutions to economic provision of military housing. The 
senices are not limited to the enactment of only one or all of the provisions. Any 
suitable combinations may be adopted. The specific legal aspects of Direct Loans and 
Loan Guarantees, Rental Guarantees, Differential Lease Payments, etc., are listed in 
Chapter 111. Summary descriptions of the specific powers with selected implementation 
examples as they pertain to PPVs are listed below (CNA, CRM 97-27, April 1997). 
1. Legislative Powers 
a. 
The Services may make direct loans to an individual person or persons 
Direct Loans and Loan Guarantees 
(i.e., private firms), with the expressed intent of acquiring or constructing housing units. 
These units are to be intended for the provision of housing units deemed habitably 
suitable for military members. 
6. Lease of Housing Units 
Pertaining to units to be constructed under the new authorities, the services 
may enter into leases. These leases may be for a specified term and may stipulate that the 
private owner of the units operate and maintain the units. Furthermore, the establishment 
of such leases may serve as the basis for private developers to obtain financing to 
construct such units. 
c1 Investments 
Services may invest in private (i.e., nongovernmental) entities with the 
expressed intent of acquiring or constructing housing units suitable for military service 
members. These investments may include, but are not.limited to: acquisition of a limited 
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partnership interest, purchase of stock or other equity instruments, purchase of bonds or 
other debt instruments, or a combination of investment forms. Cash investments are not 
to exceed one third of a project’s total capital cost. If the investment includes land or 
facilities, it is not to exceed 45 percent of the total capita1 cost. All investments must 
contain a “Collateral Incentive Agreement,” stipulating that military service members 
must be given occupancy preferences for units acquired or constructed under these 
provisions. The government may agree to guarantee minimum occupancy or rental 
income levels when entering into agreements. 
d &iffentiat Rent Payments 
The services may make additional payments to private lessors in addition 
to rental payments made by military service member occupants. The purpose of these 
payments is to maintain rents at affordable levels to military service members while 
providing economic incentive to private firm. These payments are pre-determined but 
may be reevaluated on a scheduled basis (i.e., mually or biannually) to reflect prevailing 
market wages in the surrounding area (Commander, Navy Region Southwest, 1999). 
Differential payments may also be made directly to service members 
rather than to private firms. These Differential Lease Payments are paid by the individual 
services and are approved on an individual installation basis. The Navy has recently 
approved the use of Differential Lease Payments for occupants of Country Manor, st PPV 
at Naval Station Everett, Washington (Kotzen, 1999). 
e. Conveyance or Lease of Existing Property and Facilities 
The services may convey or lease government property or kcilities to a 
private person or persons. The proceeds of such transactions must be used to cany out 
34 
activities (i.e., the acquisition or construction of suitable housing units) under these 
authorities. Conveyance or lease agreements must, by law, also include a preference for 
military service members and their families. 
J: Ancilhry Support FaciIiries 
In addition to housing, other projects may be undertaken to provide 
ancillary support to military housing (e.g., child care, day care and community centers, 
housing offices, dining and other similar fkcilities. 
g. 
Services may assign service members to housing acquired or constructed 
Assignment of Service Members to Homing Units 
under these authorizations. If the government does not own or directly lease the units, 
service members retain their eligibility for Basic Allowance for Housing @AH). 
Services may require personnel leasing housing under these provisions to have rental 
payments directly deducted fiom their pay in the form of allotments (CNA, CRM 97-27, 
April 1997). 
2. Analysis of the PPV 
The legislative powers recently afforded to DoD are relatively broad. These 
powers are discussed and interpreted below. 
a, Subsidies 
The Services have two main goals related to PPVs: increase the quality of 
housing offered to service members and capture the economic efficiencies of the private 
housing market. Quality refers to the aspects of construction, location and affordability. 
In short, DoD wants to make PPVs economically attractive to potential bidders (i,e., 
profitable endeavors) and avoid some of the potential pitfalls (discussed later in this 
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chapter) (CNA, CRM 97-27, April 1997). The services are evidently pursuing standard 
business practices of high quality, low cost and satisfied military customers. 
The combination of factors are not always profitable for private sector 
fm, usually as a result of prevailing market rates. Realizing this, the government 
enacted the authorizations to afford the services the means to incentivize private firms. 
The point is to make development and management of housing projects profitable &om 
the perspective of private business partners. The specific powers listed earlier (e.g., loan 
guarantees) are designed to increase potential profitability for private firms at any given 
level of risk, or to reduce the level of risk. 
All of the subsidies can be converted into an equivalent (usually up fiont, 
prior to project commencement) cash payment (contribution) to the private firm. This 
cash payment is intended to produce the necessary capital for project initiation and to 
mitigate risk to private firms (CNA, CRM 97-27, April 1997). Subsidies, however, 
contain their own pitfblls, one of which is rent-controlled projects, described next. 
b. Rent-Controlled Projects 
The DoD goal of providing affordable housing to service members may 
also stimulate rent-controlled housing to service members. As part of a PPV, private 
f m  m y  be contracted to provide housing to service members at guaranteed rental 
ceilings. Savice members can either pay rents directly to landlords in an amount equal 
to their housing allowance, or pay them by allotment. The intent of the PPV is to provide 
better quality housing at a lower overall cost to DoD (i.e., its fair market value exceeds 
that of the individuals’ housing allowance but is subsidized by the government, not the 
service member, to produce economic profitability for the private firm). 
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The problem with this scenario is that it encourages disinvestment by the 
private firm. In the competitive, unsubsidized housing market, for example, landlords 
have the incentive to properly maintain and modernize housing units. Failure to do so 
results in the degradation of the properties, thereby reducing the rents that individuals are 
willing to pay to occupy them. With subsidies, private firms have little or no incentive to 
partake in such modernization and upkeep. They are guaranteed minimum rental levels, 
a combination of the service members’ housing allowances and government subsidies. In 
an effort to maximize profits, therefore, private fims have the incentive to minimize 
maintenance and modernization in order to achieve the greatest potential profit on their 
units. Over time, units will deteriorate in quality, ultimately reaching the point where 
they become worth only the level of rent paid directly by the service member. 
Additionally, there will be no incentive to produce higher quality Units, as they will be 
barely profitable or provide zero total profit. 
Disinvestment of this type most commonly appears in the form of reduced 
maintenance and repairs. There are other forms, however. These include hiring less 
qualified landlords and staff or using inferior Maintenance and building supplies. All of 
these fiictors can erode the quality of life gains sought by the services when entering into 
PPV agreements. 
The services could specify maintenance requirements in the original 
contracts to counter the disinvestment effects. These stipulations can be difficult and 
costly to enforce, however. Controlling the quality of building and maintenance supplies 
and maintaining contract compliance on qualitative measures can be tricky. 
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Ideally, service members could be given the fiiU amount of the rent. This 
would include their housing allowance plus the government subsidy. In the event of 
disinvestment by the private firm, service members could relocate to housing units better 
matched (in appearance and quality) to the fi.111 level of their rent allowance. 
c. Ineffcient Resource Allocation 
Housing allowances are based on paygrade and marital status and vary by 
geographic location. Unlike traditional on-base housing, where service members give up 
varying levels of housing allowances to occupy similar quarters, private sector housing 
allowances provide varying levels of rental income to private firms. If, under a PPV, 
private firms receive rents equal to the service member’s housing allowance @lus a fixed 
government subsidy), there exists an incentive for firms to rent units to those service 
members with the highest housing allowances. Furthermore, private firms will be 
incentivized to place these individuals in the smallest possible dwelling, as it will 
maximize their profits. This will favor senior service members, who receive the highest 
housing allowances, while disfavoring junior members with large families, as their 
housing allowances are typically much smaller. Long waiting lists will likely develop for 
junior service members, thereby having a negative impact on the overall goal of 
providing quality, affordable housing to all service members (CNA, CRM 97-27, April 
1997). 
. 
3. Barriers to PPV Implementation 
Despite the various powers afforded to DoD in the aforementioned legislative 
authorities, successful implementation of PPVs has been slow. Identification and 
adoption of proposed PPV projects must undergo intense scrutiny, both military and 
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Congressional, before any proposals may proceed (GAO, NSIAD-98-178, July 1998). 
Some of the reasons for implementation problems are listed below. 
a. Cost Benefit Analysis 
PPVs are understandably complex. As previously explained, disinvest- 
ment incentives run countermand to the services’ objectives. In addition to the long-term 
disinvestment uncertainty, the quantification of true PPV costs has proved to be illusive. 
Significant monitoring and oversight throughout the life of a contract might be a remedy, 
however, no known cost benefit analyses were uncovered. Additionally, expensive 
contract monitoring could conceivably erode the anticipated financial gains of PPV 
projects. An accurate cost benefit analysis of a proposed PPV is an area requiring 
additional research and resources. 
b. Scoring 
... when an agency is authorized to enter into a contract for the purchase, 
lease-purchase, or lease of a capital asset, budget authority will be scored 
in the year in which authority is first made available in the amount of the 
Government’s total estimated obligation. (Credit Reform Act of 1990,2 
U.S.C. 661) 
This legislation proves problematic for the successful implementation of 
PPVs because it requires that the total estimated obligation of the government for a PPV 
occur within the budget year authority of the implementation of the proposed project. 
Specifically, PPV capital leases and lease purchases are scored when they are signed. 
In an era of reduced housing budgets, scoring makes the implementation 
of PPV projects appear very costly up fiont. While they may be economically more cost- 
effective than other housing projects in the long run, it has become a difficult decision to 
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opt for large, capital-intensive projects when faced with the need to modernize and 
replace military weapon assets. 
c. Navy’s Release of Funds 
Further compounding the problem (Navy example) is the stymied release 
of $3OM, held by the Navy’s Logistics (N4), earmarked for the Navy’s share of 19 PPV 
“candidate locations.” Awaiting guidance fkom the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, N4 
was prohibited fiom releasing the funds to the PPV candidates. Despite the authority 
later granted (January 1998), N4 has not released the funds to date. Instead, N4 is trying 
to determine the best suitable approach to meet the need of fleet CINCS, while adhering 
to the new guidance fkom Assistant Secretary of the Navy that PPV projects be adopted 
regionally in whole-base efforts, and not by singular projects (Desbrow, 1998). 
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Installation and regional managers are fiustrated by the lack of a 
Lack of Documented PPVApproval Process 
formalized documented process for seeking approval of PPVs. Unable to successfully 
analyze and interpret the numerous federal statues and regulations (as well as individual 
state statutes), installation and regional legal counsel seek the support of service legal 
counsels. They, in turn, seek agreement with various civilian agencies but predominately 
disagree on the interpretations of the statutes involved. The net result is the failure of 




Even ifPPVs are able to successfblly overcome the obstructions to adoption that 
Negative Potential Results of PPV Implementation 
have been discussed, there are potential negative results to even successfully-mplemented 
PPVs. These are explained below. 
a. 
A government PPV with a loan guarantee or subsidy reduces the interest 
rate at which a private developer borrows money to finance the project. This creates the 
net effect of reducing equity stake, and hence financial liability of the private developer. 
This is especially true as the loan value increases. This creates the potential incentive of 
lowering the value of the property on the part of the private owner by reducing mainten- 
ance and upgrades. When the property value continues to fall as a result of Wed upkeep 
or neglect, a negative equity situation can actually be reached. Once a negative equity 
situation exists, an owner has no real economic incentive to increase the value of the 
property through maintenance and upkeep because their “losses” will not increase. The 
loss difference is instead borne by the government who guaranteed or subsidized the loan. 
Once in a negative equity situation, a private firm may be incentivized to further neglect 
the property and obtain all that it can by ‘‘milking the property.” The firm would 
continue to collect guaranteed rents as stipulated by the contract’s provisions, similar to 
the Savings & Loan crises of the 1980s (CNA, CRM 97-27, April 1997). 
b. Rent and Occupancy Guarantees 
As the government seeks to preserve housing rents at affordable levels, it 
Government Subsidies and Loan Guarantees 
often sets rental guarantee levels. This includes guaranteed occupancy levels, usually 
stated as a minimum guaranteed occupancy rate and guaranteed rental rates. The intent 
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is to provide better housing (i.e., quality at or above market rates but a guaranteed rate 
below the market level to the service members). The intent is also to create an incentive 
for firms to undertake the projects, as they are guaranteed minimum incomes. 
This situation is advantageous when the market level increases, as service 
members are “locked into” guaranteed rent levels below the prevailing market rate. This 
is somewhat problematic, however, in that it (again) creates an incentive for the private 
owner to neglect maintenance and modernization. Why keep the housing at market price 
quality levels when the guaranteed rent is below that level anyway? 
As market rental prices decrease, the situation can deteriorate. Private 
fvms have no incentive to improve the units, for they are now valued above the market 
wage. Firms are guaranteed rents at the previous level, above the market wage! The 
incentive is to neglect the property and increase the profitably of each unit, for the rent is 
guaranteed at a fixed, higher level (CNA, CRM 97-27, April 1997). 
5. Potential Side Effects of Successful PPV Implementation 
Even ifthe government is able to successfully overcome the various negative 
effects of the guarantees associated with PPVs, either by favorable market conditions or 
contract adjustment clauses, there are other potential problems. 
a. Reducing Competithn 
The essence of competition is that fmns enter the market (e.g., housing) 
when the potential for profits exits. When fticed with guaranteed rental incomes (fiom 
the aforementioned rental and occupancy guarantees), private firms will bid on the 
proposed government PPV projects. 
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Without a guarantee that the government will not continue to increase its 
number of PPV projects in the same area, private firms may be less inclined to bid on 
projects. Their fear, understandably, is that an increased number of additional housing 
units will eventually lower the overall market housing rates. This could affect subsequent 
PPV projects and lower the "guaranteed rental profits" that they represent. This, in turn, 
could deter private firms &om bidding on subsequent PPV projects. This reduces 
competition fiom the PPV housing projects, creating the undesirable scenario of "private 
industry [rehsing] to invest adequately with the expectation that the military will do it" 
(CNA, CRM 97-27, April 1997). 
b. Waiting Lkb  
If the military is able to successhlly implement PPVs to provide high 
quality units at below market rates, a potential inequity may result. 'When subsidy levels 
differ for different projects, individuals will seek to maximize their benefits (Le., their 
value of the subsidy). Service members will opt for the best Unit (in quality and size) at 
the greatest subsidy level. The result will be long waiting lists for the most desirable 
projects. Unless the military can devise an adequate strategy to equitably assign the more 
and less desirable units, some will receive an inequitable subsidy (CNA, CRM 97-27, 
April 1997). 
This is similar to the perceived subsidies of the different military housing 
units in major fleet concentration areas. In San Diego, for example, the waiting list for 
the most desirable military housing units (i.e., the largest, highest quality units) is already 
18-24 months long (Commander, Navy Region Southwest, 1999). 
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C. THE SAN DIEGO PPV PROJECT: AN EXAMPLE 
San Diego, California epitomizes the housing dilemma. As of Summer 1999, San 
Diego military housing is facing several serious problems. There is currently a revitaliza- 
tion backlog (of existing units) at an estimated cost of $1 88 million. The replacement 
backlog of units stands at 812. The projected housing deficit by 2003 is 3,662 units. 
Approximately 6,000 families are on the waiting list for military housing with wait times 
averaging 18 months (Assistant Chief of Staff, Housing, San Diego, 1999). 
The above problems have led the Navy Region Southwest, the agency responsible 
for military housing in the San Diego area, to adopt a primary goal: To help more Sailors 
and Marines obtain housing fhster (Commander, Navy Region Southwest, 1999). 
Realizing that the forecasted timefiames were countermand to the goal of expediency, 
San Diego started exploring PPV alternatives. 
1. Lessons Learned From Everett 
San Diego began researching PPVs by examining existing and in-progress PPV 
programs. The Navy’s premier program is located in Everett, Washington. In 1997, the 
Navy invested $5.9 M in a limited partnership to develop 185 units on private land. The 
total development cost of the project is $18.8 M with a term of 10 years. Beginning in 
year six of the project, where initial occupancy began in the Fall of 1997, units will be 
sold at the rate of 20 percent per year. Military families are given preference in the 
purchase of these units. The rents for these units, prior to sale, are fixed at levels below 
the prevailing market rate. 
The project is deemed successhl except for this problem: the rents paid, although 
fixed at levels below the market rate, exceed the housing allowances of the majority of 
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the occupants (who must pay all of their BAH to the private owner as rent). To remedy 
this, the Navy obtained Congressional approval (August 1999) to offer Differential Lease 
Payments (DLP-see chapter In>. Once implemented, these DLPs have eliminated the 
only apparent drawback to the Everett PPV, and eliminate out-of-pocket housing 
expenses for some military families. 
2, 
Witnessing Everett’s success in rapidly meeting their housing demands while 
providing affordable quality housing to sewice members, San Diego explored similar 
PPV considerations. 
San Diego Draws Upon the Everett Example 
The Navy Region Southwest identified 2,660 units at 18 housing sites for 
potential PPV consideration. The 18 sites were selected based upon size (i.e., an average 
of only 103 units per site). Economic analysis conducted by the Navy Region Southwest 
indicates that it is more costly on a per unit basis to maintain small sites due to economies 
of scale. The goal is to execute $7.1 M of revitalization on existing units, demolish and 
replace 812 units at one site (Cabrillo Heights) and construct a total of 588 deficit 
reduction units at two sites (Assistant Chief of Staff, Housing, San Diego, 1999). 
3. Acceptability Standards 
The Navy Region Southwest, pursuant to its goal of helping more Sailors and 
Marines obtain housing fkster, adopted minimum acceptability standards for proposed 
PPVs. Any proposal would have to meet all of the acceptability standards. Failure to do 
so would result in elimination of the project for consideration. The standards, set by 
Navy Region Southwest executives, include the following: 
Minimize government risk while maximizing the multiplier effect of 
scarce financial resources. 
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Obtain life cycle cost savings. 
Avoid selling landassets to mitigate the risk of potential PPV failure 
(which would result in the loss of ownership or use of government land). 
Use high quality, energy efficient designs, materials and construction. 
Ensure adequate unit size for each family. 
0 Ensure safe housing in close proximity to work. 
0 Ensure zero out-of-pocket expenses for rents (given normal utility usage): 
4. Limitations 
The San Diego housing market is historically expensive. Recently, direct home 
purchases have become very costly, mostly as a result of the housing boom of the 1980s, 
direct home purchases have become very costly. Plagued with low vacancy rates (1.5 
percent), low capitalization rates, long lead times for developable land and a high cost for 
developable land (an average of $20K per unit), the regional staffrealized the potential 
shortcoming. Given the aforementioned constraints, it would be unprofitable for private 
firms to develop existing units or build new units on private land. Only by using existing 
government land could PPV proposals simultmeously provide private profit incentives 
while keeping development and maintenance costs low, thereby ensuring low rent levels. 
5. Preferred Business Entity 
To minimize risk to DoD, obtain Navy housing goals (including the previously 
listed San Diego Acceptability Standards), and ensure profit incentives for potential 
business partners, the Navy Region Southwest has adopted a Limited Liability Company 
(LLC) as the preferred method of PPV proposals. 
46 
The LLC is a relatively new type of business entity. Its most attractive features 
are that it provides the liability protection of a corporation at the taxation of a partnership. 
Unlike a partnership, a LLC provides liability protection while affording the owners (i,e., 
the Navy and the private firm) the right to actively participate in the management of the 
company. LLC owners are called “members” and may consist of individuals, partner- 
ships, trusts, corporations and nonresident aliens. Liability for all members is limited 
only to the amount of each member’s investment in the company. LLCs may also be 
managed externally, should the members agree. By creation statutes, LLCs generally 
contain the partnership characteristic of a limited lifespan. The key advantage that this 
arrangement provides is that in the event of death, bankruptcy, insolvency, mental 
incapacity or withdrawal of a member fiom the LLC, the LLC is subjected to a 
“termination event.” The remaining members may decide to reorganize, which is 
typically tax-free. Lastly, an LLC is usually not permitted to exchange in the ‘‘fiee 
transferability of ownership interests,” meaning that a member may not freely exchange, 
sell or give hidher ownership interest. Owners may assign rights to LLC income but may 
not assign voting rights (Greenberg, 1996 & 1997). While a complete legal explanation 
of LLCs is beyond the scope of this thesis, a few of the more salient features are listed 
below. 
0 Easily adaptable to short-term agreements: The intended timefiame for 
the San Diego PPV is 10- 15 years. 
Protection: Provides minimal legal liability of government assets while 
maintaining ownership rights. 
0 Input: Af5ords input decision control for designing and modlfying PPVs. 
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Flexible: LLCs allow flexible, in-term modifications, and allowing 
reactionary changes to fluctuations in market conditions. 
Ownership: Ownership distribution is based upon respective contribution 
(ie., cash d u e  of assets and improvements, such as dwellings). 
a Debt: Private developer secures and guarantees debt. 
Rents: Used to fund operating costs, service debt, create management 
incentive fees and returns on risk. Residuals (excess) are deposited into a 
DON operating reserve account used to recapitalize the assets over the 
long term. 
Collateralize debt: Only restrictive leasehold interest in land and units 
will collateralize debt (the Navy can not lose land or units in the event of 
private default on the debt). 
Allocations and Distributions of cash flow: The right to such distributions 
can not be altered fiom those described in the agreement. 
Proceeds: Net sale or disposition proceeds remain in the project. 
Management Board: Adoption creates an LLC Management Board, of 
which the Navy is a primary stakeholder, preserving the Navy’s legal 
ability to Muence decisions of the LLC. 
Guarantees: Performance bonds and personal and corporate guarantees 
provided during project construction. 
a Funds: DON funds held by trustee-managed escrow account and agency, 
ensuring systematic, independent dispersal of funds based upon consulting 
architect approval. 
Budgets: Short-term rehabilitation and long-term recapitalization based 
upon DON-approved (prior to adoption) budgets. 
Separation of Responsibility: Debt and property management are kept 
separate. Preserves the ability to require the property’s Managing 
Member to re-compete property management agreement, thereby 
theoretically ensuring price competition and minimal quality standards. 
Consent: Expenditures over budget amounts must be approved by DON 
(Assistant Chief of St&, Housing, San Diego, 1999). 
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6. Financial Summary 
The final cost breakdown of the proposed San Diego PPV is listed below 
(Assistant Chief of S@ Housing, San Diego, 1999). 
First mortgage: $130.3M 
Government E Q q :  $20.9M 
Total development cost: $1 5 1.2M 
Leverage achieved: 10.5:l 
Life cycle cost savings: 1 1.1 percent 
om scoring: $20.9M (the government’s equity) 
7. Summary 
With the proposed PPV in San Diego, the region will privatize 2,660 units, 
demolish and replace 8 12 Units, revitalize 1,260 units and construct 588 new units. This 
will achieve the replacement backlog of 812 units and reduce the projected 2003 deficit 
of 3,662 units by 588 at cost of only $20.9M, rather than the $188M for the current 
revitalization backlog. 
8, Timeline 
Initial research into the San Diego PPV began in June 1997. Congressional 
notification was given at the end of 1998. Congressional approval is still pending. The 
Region is behind its proposed deadline of August 3, 1999, to issue a Request for 
Proposals (RFP) and will likely ;Fail to meet its targeted award date of August 2000 
(Commander, Navy Region Southwest, 1999). 
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San Diego is not alone in its inability to rapidly adopt PPVs. Mired by intense 
Congressional scrutiny and complicated by a lack of formal adoption procedures, the 
PPV approval and adoption process is cumbersome. Everett experienced similar delays 
in the adoption of its successful pilot project. The Naval Facilities Engineering 
Command (NAVFAC) San Diego, the entity responsible for awarding the final PPV, has 
stated that it has yet to issue an RFP. NAVFAC fiuther indicates that project award will 
take 12-18 months, despite focused efforts and planning for more timely implementation 
(Housing Director, NAVFAC, 1999). 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter explored the various components, advantages and disadvantages of 
the Public Private Venture (PPV). The economic advantages of the PPV may be sound 
based upon recent legislative changes, however, true cost benefit analyses are lacking. 
There certainly exists the potential to minimize government financial outlays and 
mitigate risk while expediently resolving the housing problem. The PPV is not without 
potential disadvantages, however. Namely, there exists a strong potential for disinvest- 
ment and the erosion of quality. While the likelihood of the disadvantages can be 
decreased, particularly through the use of clauses (those inherent as well as stipulated in 
PPVs, namely the LLC adopted by San Diego), only time will reveal the existence of 
potential drawbacks. This makes PPVs still somewhat speculative in nature. 
The San Diego LLC (PPV) demonstrates that difficult impediments can be 
mitigated when working outside the framework of traditional MILCON procedures (i.e., 
construction and revitalization backlogs and costs). The process is lengthy, however, and 
requires dedicated resources and personnel. 
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Chapter V examines an alternative to the status quo (i.e., MILCON) and the PPV, 
namely, the complete privatization of military hous&g. This arrangement calls for the 
divestiture of all government assets and liability, as they pertain to the provision of 
housing service members. 
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V. COMPLETE PRIVATIZATION OF MILITARY HOUSING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the components, advantages and disadvantages of 
complete privatization of military housing, including eliminating financial incentives for 
occupying military housing. In complete privatization DoD is entirely removed from 
providing housing and housing maintenance. Instead, DoD would provide housing 
allowances to all service members and have them obtain housing from the private 
housing market on or around military installations. While the option of obtaining 
housing &om the private market is currently available to all service members, except of 
single members below the paygrade of E5, there is still a financial incentive to occupy 
government housing. This chapter discusses implications of eliminating financial 
incentives. 
B. COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE SECTOR PROVISION OF 
HOUSING 
Simply stated, it currently costs the government more to house members in 
military housing than in private sector housing on a per-fimily-housed average basis. 
Reports also indicate that members occupying military housing value the housing at a 
level less than the true cost borne by the services (CNA, CRM 97-25, April 1997). 
1. Cost Analysis 
Table 1 compares the costs of housing military members in military housing with 
private sector housing (CAN, CRM 97-25, April 1997). 
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Table 1. Comparison of Annual Housing Cost Per Sailor (FY 1996%) 
Source of Government 
funding 
USN budget 
Dept. of Education 
(school impact aid) 
Total Cost to Government 
Contribution per saiIor 
(out-of-pocket expense) 




$ 0  





Total housing and utility $15,100 $1 0,100 
cost 
Source: CNA, CRM 97-25, April 1997). 
The above figures reflect economic steady-state, i.e., the amount of budgetary 
fhding required to maintain the housing stock at its current quality level (CNA, CRM 
97-25, April 1997). 
Table 1 shows that on average, off-base housing costs are less than on-base 
housing costs. Additionally, the average cost of $15,100 to house a military family may 
be understated. The cost figure includes the opportunity costs of the land and dwellings 
that the service members currently occupy (k., their economic value for alternative 
uses). 
Not counting the out-of-pocket expenses borne by the service members occupying 
the quarters, the services are paying a "preInium" of $7,000 to house each member in 
military housing ($15,100-$8,100). 
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The Navy, for example, operates approximately 60,000 M y  housing units. 
This equates to a total annual “premium” of approximately $420M ($7,000 x 60,000). Of 
this total, $310M comes directly fiom the Navy’s budget and approximately $120M 
comes from the Department of Education through School Impact Aid. 
If the Navy were to eliminate the military housing option, it could increase 
allowances to all of its service members by approximately $1,250 annually. This would 
entail transferring currently housed members to an allowance status at the comparable 
paygrade level for those not occupying government quarters) by $1,250 annually. This 
increase in allowances would reduce out-of-pocket expenses fiom the current 19.8 
percent to approximately 7 percent (CNA, CRM 97-25, April 1997). This is consistent 
with the Secretary of Defense goal of reducing out-of-pocket expenses for all military 
service members, and would even exceed his targeted reduction to 15.8 percent by 2003 
(Garamone, 1999). 
Additional savings are also possible. If the Navy were to remove itself fiom the 
provision and maintenance of military housing, it could reprogram the MILCON dollars 
currently obligated for these functions. Furthermore, some of the existing housing assets 
(i.e., land and dwellings) could be sold or leased generating additional revenue. These 
savings could be fixther transferred to service members in the form of increased housing 
allowances, eventually eliminating out-of-pocket housing expenses. This would 
eliminate or greatly reduce the economic incentive of military members to occupy 
military housing. 
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2. Benefit Analysis 
Despite annual expenditures by the Navy of $15,100 per family for military 
housing, surveys indicate that the majority of military Pavy, in this example) fiimilies 
value base housing benefits below their actual cost of provision. For example, a 1995 
Variable Housing Allowance Survey asked, “If military housing had been available when 
you reported to this duty station, would you have elected to live in government housing 
instead of private sector housing?” Center for Naval Analyses computed f b d y  housing 
preferences by paygrade. As paygrade increased (particularly in the enlisted ranks who 
receive smaller base pay and housing allowances), preference for military housing 
decreased. At the E9 level for example, less than one third of respondents indicated that 
they prefer military housing. At the E6 level, 48 percent expressed a preference for 
military housing. CNA postulated that if offered $10,650 (E6 allowance level with zero 
out-of-pocket expenses), most families would choose private housing. This figure was 
used to estimate an upper-value of on-base housing for most service members. While 
admitting that $10,650 might not be enough to entice all families to select private 
housing, extrapolation fiom CNA’s trended data indicates that at that value, the 
preference for on-base housing reaches a “significant minority” (CNA, CRM 97-25, 
April 1997). This preference for private housing would likely increase as allowances 
increase above the $10,650 upper value while still remaining below the average current 
cost of $13,100 (Navy example). 
A commonly accepted benefit of on-base housing is improved Quality of Life, 
such as the social benefit of housing fellow service members as neighbors. Other 
benefits include proximity to work, (particularly if housing is located on-base), increased 
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security, and support for deployed service members. While surveys indicate that these 
benefits do exist, a 1996 study conducted by RAND’S National Defense Research 
Institute (NRDI) indicates that “military members are drawn to the economy of on-base 
living and not by other features of military housing.” The study further concludes that, 
on the margin, increasing housing allowances would “be a bargain” to DoD compared to 
the higher costs of housing =lies in military housing. 
The overall conclusions of the 1996 RAND study present three findings. First, 
military families “value” military housing more than the current value of their housing 
allowances. Second, the strong demand for military housing is a direct result of the 
perceived economic “benefit gap” in occupying military housing. And third, service 
members do not View the additional, non-economic benefits of occupying military 
housing as critical. 
Two independent studies have therefore concluded that the primary consideration 
when service members opt for military housing is predominately economic (CNA, CRM 
97-25, April 1997 and RAND NDRI, 1996). 
3. Cost-Benefit Comparison 
As long as service members are experiencing out-of-pocket expenses, any 
increase in housing allowance provides a true, dollar-for-dollar increase in welfare, as 
housing allowances are tax fiee. 
Utilizing expected values, the CNA study compared the costs of providing 
housing for the Navy to the benefit derived (using the upper end conservative estimate 0‘ 
$10,650 fiom the survey). Currently, approximately 25 percent of Navy families occupy 
military housing. The other 75 percent receive allowances. Given the assumption that 
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the assignment of housing is perkctly fair (Le., one could continue to expect to be able to 
occupy military housing for an average 25 percent of career time), the expected value of 
the current housing benefit to sailors is $8,590 annually. 
This figure is far below the Navy’s current annual cost of $13,100 to provide 
military housing. This afkrds the opprtUnity to not only realize savings by removing 
itself from the housing provision business but also by reprogramming the Navy’s current 
MILCON budgetary dollars and selling or leasing its land and dwelling assets (CNA, 
CRM 97-25, April 1997). 
C. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH COMPLETE PRIVATIZATION 
While the studies discussed above provide empirical support for the financial 
advantages of complete privatization, various disadvantages warrant discussion, such as 
potential cultural and economic concerns, as well as circumstances when private markets 
may not provide economically sound solutions. 
1. Cultural Concerns 
Service members may suffer hardship when forced to personally secure housing 
in the private sector. The likelihood of this potential hardship can be mitigated, however. 
Bases can continue to maintain Housing Offices. The offices’ focus would have to shift 
to strictly referrals, however. Current referral services (i.e., surrounding apartments and 
houses for rent or sale, information on schools and other community entities, etc.) could 
be expanded to meet the increased need that would arise if all members were relegated to 
securing private housing. Comment files could be maintained, based upon previous 
service members’ complaints and comments, regarding surrounding housing success or 
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failures. And the military could even increase mediation and arbitration services in the 
event of landlord-tenant complaints (CNA, CRM 97-25, April 1997). 
The other major cultural concern is the assimilation of young enlisted. Realizing 
the cultural impact of new service members transitioning to military life, DoD has often 
touted shared living (ie., having military neighbors) as beneficial to acculturation. The 
surveys previously cited indicate that this concern is not strongly shared by junior level 
service members. Furthermore, the majority of Navy family housing allowances are 
devoted to E5 and E6 paygrades, not junior personnel. A 1997 CNA study indicates that 
approximately 90 percent of Navy family housing can be privatized without affecting 
acculturation of paygrades E 1 -E3. 
2. Economic Concerns 
Some military leaders evidently doubt the private housing market’s capacity to 
provide additional housing (Commander, Navy Region Southwest, 1999). The concern is 
that the private market is too slow to respond to increased demand (i.e., ifall service 
members were housed in the private sector). In other words, fundamental shifts in supply 
and demand would cause the rents on existing dwellings to skyrocket, adversely 
impacting service members on fixed allowances. 
Q. 
The continental United States private sector housing market currently 
Responsiveness of the Private Housing Market 
provides approximately 1 OOM residences. Additions to this market increase at an annual 
rate of approximately 1.4M units. According to CNA (1997), populations shift around 
the country, the private sector housing market tends to respond to changing levels of 
supply and demand, although time delays do occur. Given the overall numbers, the most 
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likely outcome would be that the private housing market would adjust to accommodate 
an additional 60,000 f;.unilies, the approximate number of military members currently 
residing in military housing (CNA, CRM 97-25, April 1997). 
6. PriceEffeecfs 
Potential price effects (i.e., rental increases) resulting f?om the complete 
privatization of military housing can be viewed in terms of short and long-term effects. 
In the short term (ie., if all military housing were quickly privatized), 
there likely would be no immediate effect on local rent increases. Ownership of military 
housing units would change, but the overall total number of units would remain fairly 
constant in the short term (CNA, CRM 97-25, April 1997). 
Concerning the long term effects on prices, CNA considered the example 
of the overnight transition to complete private housing by estimating the effects on local 
rents in 53 Navy housing markets. The study utilized supply and demand elasticities 
&om existing literature. In only two housing markets, Whidbey Island and Washington 
D.C./Dahlgren, Virginia, rents were projected to increase by more than 10 percent in the 
long run. The overall median increase, for all markets, was estimated at approximately 
1/10 of one percent (CNA, CRM 97-25, April 1997). 
Robert Tope1 and Sherwin Rosen estimated in the Journal of Political 
Economy 96 that the transition fiom the short to long term would occur predominately 
within one year and completely within three years. 
3. Market Conditions and DoD Intervention 
Even though the private market is responsive to supply and demand, DoD may 
still have to intervene to guarantee the availability of housing at affordable prices. 
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a. Monopoly 
Monopoly in the private housing market occurs when only one jurisdiction 
surrounds a military installation. This jurisdiction may intentionally raise rents by 
restricting new development. Most often these restrictions come in the form of refusal to 
issue new construction permits or charging excessively high taxes and fees on new 
residences. 
While this outcome, were it to come to hition, could be legally 
challenged in the courts, the military retains another potential alternative. DoD could 
build or threaten to build housing units on its own land. While a complete Cost-Benefit 
study would need to precede this decision, the action or threat of action may cause 
reconsideration on the part of the local jurisdiction, as DoD’s efforts would impact the 
profitability of private firms. Meaningful community relations programs also have the 
potential to mitigate the monopoly circumstance. 
6. Monopsony 
Monopsony is a situation where one buyer (i.e., DoD) seeks the products 
or services of several sellers (i.e., private housing market firms). This situation is 
realized when the military is the predominant employer in the local area. The potential 
drawbacks to monopsony are basically twofold. First, ifprivate developers fear that the 
military may leave an area, then they may not provide quality affordable housing. 
A second concern is that the military may decide to intervene in the 
housing market by building its own housing units in an effort to intentionally drive down 
rents. 
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The remedy to both potential problems is trustworthy communication. 
The private sector currently provides an adequate quantity of housing in “one-company 
towns” throughout the nation. While these companies also face the possibility of going 
out of business (or relocating), the private housing market still appears to provide 
adequate affordable housing. The military must endeavor to constantly keep the 
surrounding community apprised of DoD’s intentions. Unless additional rounds of Base 
Reallignment and Closure (BRAC) are authorized, installations do not close or move on 
their accord. If bases are ever considered for closure or relocation, DoD must make 
every effort to keep the potentially affected communities informed as early as possible. 
As for the fear of DoD intervening by building its own housing units, bases must work 
closely and openly with surrounding communities to ensure that it does not intend to 
undermine the private sector economics of capitalism. 
The monopsony case will most likely only ever happen in cases where the 
military maintains bases and personnel in remote locations. With the closure of the base 
at Adak, Alaska, however, these locations are currently scarce to non-existent and 
represent very few military personnel. 
C Underutilized Resources 
The situation of underutilized resources occurs when DoD maintains 
ownership of significant portions of land suitable for building housing within the local 
community. If the price of private land in the community is excessively high, there might 
exist a financial incentive for DoD to build and maintain housing on its existing, 
relatively less expensive land. 
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The mitigation to this problem is twofold. First, DoD must once again, 
engage in trutffil and timely discussions with the surrounding community, announcing 
intentions and proposing possible alternatives. Second, DoD may sell or lease the land to 
private developers with stipulating provisions (a direct result of the 1996 Defense 
Authorization Act). (CNA, CRM 97-25, April 1997). 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter presents an analysis of the components, advantages and disadvan- 
tages of complete privatization of military housing. The economic evidence to support 
complete privatization is strong. By removing itself &om the construction and mainten- 
ance of housing, DoD can realize savings substantial enough to increase housing 
allowances to all service members to a level that erodes or eliminates the current 
economic benefit of occupying military housing. Not only is this solution more cost 
effective in the long term (compared to the MILCON status quo), it rectifies the 
military’s problems of facing cost-prohibitive construction and maintenance backlogs 
that will currently take decades to resolve. 
While there are potential market conditions that may necessitate DoD’s 
intervention in the housing market, these cases are highly unlikely, occur with negligible 
fiequency, affect few service members and have the potential to be solved by DoD- 
community cooperation. 
Chapter VI will focus on the conclusions and recommendations of this thesis. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study examined the current provisions of military housing and two major 
alternatives, e.g., military construction (MILCON), and Public Private Venture (PPV) 
and complete privatization respectively. The purpose of the study was to consider these 
three different alternatives for solving the substantial housing problems facing the 
Department of Defense and its service members, i.e., insufficient quantity and quality of 
housing. The objective was to determine the most cost-effective alternative, cognizant of 
political implications of changing housing construction and maintenance policy. 
A. MILCON 
1. Conclusion 
Rooted in tradition and legislative precedence, MILCON has evolved as the 
“status quo” in the provision of military housing. MILCON applies specifically to the 
housing that is owned, constructed and maintained by the government. It is provided 
“rent fiee” to eligible service members who elect to reside in military vice private sector 
housing, e.g., approximately 25 percent of service members. Service members choosing 
to reside in private sector housing (75 percent) are afforded housing allowances which 
vaxy depending upon geographic location and paygrade. 
Given military budgetary decreases over the past decade, MILCON has fallen 
markedly behind in terms of its ability to provide timely construction and maintenance 
upgrades of military housing. The Secretary of Defense has testified that it will take 30- 
40 years and at least $20B to remedy the current military housing problems of inadequate 
quantity and quality to meet demand. Exacerbating the problem is the persistent trend in 
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reduced DoD budgetary funding levels. Even if funding levels increased, this study 
concludes that the MILCON process as is, would still be unable to respond and rectlfy the 
problem In summary, the housing construction and upgrade situation is so fiu behind, 
and so ingrained in "pork barrel" politics, that more transformative change is necessary to 
expeditiously solve the housing problem 
2. Recommendations 
Terminate as m n  as practical MILCON appropriations to construct, 
modernize and maintain military housing. 
Reliance on traditional MILCON to solve a worsening housing quantity and 
quality problem is unrealistic. Terminating the MILCON process and replacing it with a 
better alternative would initially go against standard practice. Data fiom this study and 
other sources nonetheless point to this conclusion and recommendation. There is one 
area where MILCON continues to make sense - provision of military housing in remote 
locations (i.e., where private sector provision of housing is not feasible for economic and 
logistic reasons). 
B. THE PUBLIC PRIVATE VENTURE (PPV) 
1. Conclusion 
With the passage of the 1996 Defense Authorization Act, DoD was given several 
legislative alternatives to the provision and maintenance of military housing under 
MILCON. These alternatives were discussed in Chapter IV and include: Direct Loans 
and Loan Guarantees; the Leasing of Housing Units; Differential Lease Payments (DLP); 
and the Conveyance or Leasing of Existing Property and Facilities. 
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The goal of the new legislative authorities is to capitalize on the private sector 
economic efficiencies in the provision of housing. Motivated by the lure of economic 
profits, private firms are enticed to enter the military housing market. Collaborating with 
DoD in joint Public Private Ventures (PPVs), private firms are subsidized (either in the 
provision of land, assets or capital) to make military housing projects profitable and 
worthy of investment risk. Participating fjrms are responsible for developing, providing 
and maintaining housing units while still guaranteeing availability for military service 
members. In retun?, DoD promises the participating private firms minimum occupancy 
and rental thresholds. 
The overall effect of the PPV is to leverage DoD financial risk, and shift more of 
the burden (liability) to the private sector. This is advantageous, because it allows DoD 
the opportunity to “provide” housing to its service members at a fiaction of the traditional 
MILCON costs. 
The PPV has faults, however. In an effort to spur interest (i.e., create the lure of 
economic profits), DoD must often enter into long-term contractual agreements with 
private h s .  These contracts, often lasting 20 years or’more, guarantee minimum levels 
of occupancy and rental revenue. Given the uncertainty of housing market price 
fluctuations, there exists the potential for negative equity situations to evolve, further 
exacerbating the disinvestment incentive inherent to rental guarantees. DoD may 
potentially be faced with rising housing costs, as guarantees fail to accurately reflect 
prevailing market prices. If private firms hi1 to adequately modernize and maintain the 
units (a reasonable scenario), then DoD may fail to economically provide military 
housing, including a continuation of quality problems. 
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While it is possible to stipulate maintenance and price adjustment agreements in 
PPV contracts, these stipulations are costly to enforce and are subject to extreme long- 
term forecasting. 
2. Recommendation 
Collect and Analyze data on current (ongoing) PPV pilot projects primarily 
in terms of cost efficiencies and customer satisfaction. 
Despite the potential drawbacks to PPV, it appears more cost effective and 
efficient than MILCON. DoD is currently undertaking approximately 20 pilot PPV 
projects. These projects are in various stages of completion and should provide sufficient 
data to determine the long-term practicality and cost savings of PPV. Udortunately, it 
may take several years to collect and analyze PPV data, while housing shorthlls continue 
to materialize. 
Legal obstacles to the implementation of PPVs have proven to be considerable. 
Pilot projects are routinely delayed throughout their various stages as legal uncertainties 
and a lack of formalized procedures are encountered. The San Diego PPV project 
proposal, three years old and not yet ready to solicit private proposals, is an example of 
the magnitude of legal impediments. A subsidiary recommendation is for DoD and/or 
DON to develop and publish guidelines and lessons learned, including streamlining 
legal restrictions. 
C. COMPLETE PRIVATIZATION OF MILITARY HOUSING 
1. Conclusion 
The complete privatization of military housing represents a total divestiture of all 
government-owned land and assets related to military housing. Divestment may include 
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the outright sale of these assets or their leasing. Both, however, require relinquishing all 
titles and grant deeds. Commensurate with a fundamental premise of the free market 
economy, the then private assets would be built and maintained based on the economic 
and quality demands of military and civilian customers. 
There already exists a robust private housing market. In fact, approximately 75 
percent of military service members currently reside in private sector housing. Service 
members residing in private sector housing are paid housing allowances, which vary 
depending on the service member’s paygrade and duty station geographic location. A 
1997 Center for Naval Analyses study indicated that ifNavy housing were to 
“disappear,” substantial savings would result from the Navy not having to provide, 
maintain and manage housing. In k t ,  CNA estimated that the savings would be large 
enough to pay housing allowances to those currently residing in hlitary housing, and to 
raise the allowance levels for all service members. Additionally, as discussed in Chapter 
V, the higher allowances would have the added benefit of eliminating the financial 
incentive to reside in military housing. As housing allowances are tax-fiee, each dollar 
increase in housing allowance represents a true, one-for-one dollar benefit increase in the 
financial welfare of service members. 
On a contrary note, complete privatization of military housing contains risks. 
Some installation commanders and others have indicated that service members would 
perceive a loss of benefits fiom the absence of military housing. This loss could be 
manifested in several areas: having to find housing without military assistance; loss of 
security of military neighborhoods; and loss of the support structure that military 
neighborhoods afford to the dependents of deployed service members. It is noteworthy 
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that a 1999 Evaluation of Housing Options for Military Families, conducted by RAND 
found that these types of concerns may be minimal. In other words, adaptation by young 
service members and their families to a complete private sector model may be 
accomplished easier than anticipated. In fact, 60 percent of members surveyed in the 
study cited economic advantage as their prbary reason for electing miIitary housing. If 
housing allowances were increased in the absence of military housing, then this economic 
incentive would be replaced with the increased allowances, i.e., effect on benefits derived 
would be negligible. 
Perhaps the main obstacle to the complete privatization of military housing is a 
perceived loss of control. Installation commanders would not be able to ensure that their 
service members were located close to work, thereby affecting timely recall during 
military emergencies. Of course, with 75 percent of service members currently residing 
outside the confines of military installations, this concern only affects the remaining 25 
percent living on base. The largest contributor to the perceived loss of control appears to 
come in the form of Congressional oversight afforded by the politically-laden MILCON 
procedure. In short, Congress uses MILCON as a tool for influencing spending within 
specific districts. In other words, equity concerns could override efficiency concerns. If 
the goal of military housing and housing allowances is to provide the best quality housing 




Research political and practical implications of privatizing all military 
housing and privatize as soon as practical. 
Conclusions indicate that the savings achieved by turning all military housing 
over to the private sector are substantial enough to increase housing allowances to all 
service members, and to expeditiously solve the housing problem, possibly in under 10 
years. 
In summary, complete privatization of military housing contains several strong 
advantages: fist construction of hundreddthousands of units; customer-influenced 
quality and maintenance; enough savings to increase housing allowances for all 
members; and additional savings for fleet modernization. 
D. AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
While there currently exist some studies calling for the privatization of military 
housing, namely the Navy example conducted by CNA, there is no definitive study 
pertaining to all of DoD. Such a study should be undertaken at the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD) level. Considering the level of the m u a l  MILCON 
appropriations and the need to achieve defense budget savings, the task should receive 
priority. In the long run, the benefits could be substantial. In addition to saving defense 
dollars, service members could realize increased economic benefits and an improved 
quality of life. 
The existing PPV project proposals must be fiuther studied as well. This wil take 
time, as the projects are relatively new and ongoing. Discerning and promulgating even 
preliminary results and lessons learned could better inform emerging policy decisions. 
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E. FINAL THOUGHTS 
The two popular alternatives to the MILCON provision of military housing, the 
PPV and the complete privatization of military housing, represent both incremental and 
dramatic departures fiom current thought. The military is both resistant to change and 
able to affect change on a large scale. If the ovemchhg god is to revive the military 
housing infrastructure to fit the changing requirements of a new Service, then senior 
leadership must respond to the challenge by setting a clear direction for solving the 
housing problem. 
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